Victories and Treason: From Revolution to Counterrevolution

Excerpts from “Anti-Ukrainian or The Will to Fight, Be Defeated or Be Betrayed” by Dr. Oleksandr Savchenko:

What haven’t the nationalist and patriotic forces (and I consider myself to be one of them) been able to do since independence?  Why hasn’t Ukraine become a member of the European Union?  Why did Ukraine end up the poorest country in Europe at such a breakneck speed?  In my opinion, the main problem with the Ukrainian nationalist/patriotic forces was the weak will toward power: we loved Ukraine, freedom and democracy more than the power that would have guaranteed their preservation.  Romanticism held dominion over rationalism within the Ukrainian nationalist/patriotic forces, and the word ruled over action!

Interestingly, this was understood by the old Communist elite, “red directors” and bankers.  They themselves seized the real power in the country.  And, it was these same people that made their first and second million and, in time, tens of millions of dollars in state factories and banks.  Later, they converted their earned millions into high-level state positions.  Over time a third powerful entity joined them: racketeers and conmen who all too easily became oligarchs.  These latter parties began to control the mainstream media outlets and, eventually, all of Ukraine.  It is simpler to understand this using the example of the evolution of the views and actions of the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk.

The first President of Ukraine did not have the will to battle and victory, but he already didn’t have the will to betrayal.  Civilized, democratic elections and the peaceful transfer of power to a new president astounded the West.  Such was Leonid Kravchuk’s victory.

Leonid Kuchma was an active reformer right from the start, but over time his relatives and associates became billionaires and they began to dictate the agenda of the President of Ukraine.  In the beginning of the 2000s new powerful influences on them (the oligarchs) appeared in Ukraine: the Russian Federal Security Service (the KGB).  When Boris Yeltsin’s position weakened in Russia, the power structures there strengthened.  I believe that these power structures, and not Boris Yeltsin, brought Vladimir Putin to power in the year 2000.

Of course, these power structures needed their own president in Ukraine.  The strong Ukrainian director/president, Leonid Kuchma, did not accommodate them.  As a consequence, they decided, at a minimum, to weaken his position and, with maximum effort, to substitute him with their own Viktor Yanukovich, who was Prime Minister of Ukraine at the time.  Just like in Russia.  This is precisely why the infamous “Cassette Scandal” arose, which, indeed, greatly weakened the Ukrainian president, but unexpectedly and greatly strengthened the chances of Viktor Yuschenko as a potential candidate for the position of the President of Ukraine.  During the last days of the government of the weak Leonid Kuchma, his administration was dominated by Russian secret agents.  Nevertheless, he reached the end of his term and he was already prepared to transfer power on November 21, 2004, according to the Kremlin’s scenario, to Viktor Yanukovich as a result of falsified elections.  However, Ukrainians decided otherwise.

The first Maidan revolution began.  Passionate layers of Ukrainian society along with small and mid-size businesses, who financed the Maidan revolution, decided to ruin the Kremlin’s plan to make its very own Viktor Yanukovich the President of Ukraine.  This was not the first time for Ukraine when nationalist and patriotic forces together with Ukrainian millionaires fought against a pro-Russian puppet and oligarch-millionaires for a transparent market and membership in the European Union.  The Orange Revolution was victorious thanks to the support of Europe.  Viktor Yuschenko won the elections with a result of 52% against Viktor Yanukovich’s 44%.

This happened because the first Maidan revolution did not change the system of power.  Moreover, it did not even put forth such task.  The purpose was to install their own Ukrainian politicians (close friends) into an already active political framework, which was (and still is) flawed and inefficient.  Firstly, the Ukrainian political system, in contrast with Western political systems, does not have three branches of power, legislative, executive and judicial, it has five branches, including the corruption branch (influence of oligarchs and “overseers”) and the external branch (influence of Russia until 2014 and now, in addition to Russia, the USA, EU and IMF).  Secondly, the executive branch is comprised of structures of the President and Prime Minister, which are always in conflict with one another regardless of whether a Presidential-Parliamentary or Parliamentary-Presidential version of the Constitution is in effect.  This leads to a rhetorical question: did the Orange Revolution have at least a chance to succeed?  The answer is quite obvious: No.  The crux of the matter does not even lie within Viktor Yuschenko, who quickly became a hostage of the strong oligarchical corrupt system of power in Ukraine.

I confirm: none of the political and state functionaries at that time even put forth the question of a change of the completely corrupt system of power – they orchestrated such system.

After the second Maidan revolution, having known all of the players who found themselves in power, I already did not have hope for the radical modernization of the country.  I tried to at least provide advice on how to halt the collapse of the economy and the income and foreign currency of Ukrainians.  For example, on the first day of the escape of Viktor Yanukovich from Ukraine, I adamantly demanded a meeting with Oleksandr Turchynov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk in order to avoid the outflow, in my calculation, of 5 billion dollars from the country via various bank accounts.  Viktor Yanukovich and his entourage had already siphoned off a horde of cash (2-3 billion dollars, in my estimate), but I believed at the time and still believe that there was cash on various bank accounts that could have been saved!  Unsurprisingly, their telephones went unanswered, time passed, and these parliamentary deputy acquaintances of mine either couldn’t or didn’t wish to organize a meeting.  So, what was my proposal?  To suspend the banking system for a few days and, as a consequence, all transfers could have been stopped and the money could have been returned.  I repeat, we are talking about 5 billion dollars!  Alas, incompetence and corruption seized the day; dollars were funneled out and the hryvnia collapsed.  There’s a price for everything!... 

News

Frishberg & Partners 2012